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POWERS OF APPOINTMENT TO
UNSPECIFIED CHARITIES
WILLiAm F. FRATCHER*
Every law school graduate remembers, albeit dimly, the sad fate of
Ann Cracherode's will. How she bequeathed her personal estate to the
Bishop of Durham upon trust to dispose of the residue to such objects
of benevolence and liberality as the bishop in his own discretion should
most approve of. How the good bishop disclaimed any beneficial interest
in himself personally and declared his intention of devoting the residue
to charity if allowed to do so. How the Attorney-General's' argument
that Ann intended to confine her trust to charity was exploded by Sir
Samuel Romilly's sly suggestion that the bishop's entertaining his hunt-
ing companions with liquor would be an object of liberality. And how the
great expounder of equity, Lord Eldon,2 decreed that, because Ann's trust
was "for purposes not sufficiently defined to be controlled and managed
by this Court," it failed and the Bishop of Durham held on resulting
trust for Ann's next of kin.3
As law students ordinarily study Morice v. The Bishop of Durham8
before they have mastered the structure of the trust device or even heard
of powers of appointment and charitable trusts, it is not surprising that
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri; member of the Michigan and Mis-
souri Bars; Reporter for the Uniform Probate Code; General Reporter on Trust
Law for the International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law-ED.
1. The Attorney-General, the Honourable Spencer Perceval, also had a sad
fate. He became prime minister in 1809 and was murdered at the door of the
House of Commons three years later, the only British prime minister to die at
the hands of an assassin.
2. John Scott, son of a lowly coal barge owner, ruined his chances of becom-
ing a country clergyman by climbing a ladder and carrying off the young daughter
of a leading banker who had forbidden him to call. The parties to this romantic
elopement went through a furtive marriage ceremony in Scotland and, after a
period of near-starvation, the bridegroom changed his ambitions from the church
to the law. The bride's family eventually forgave the errant couple and, indeed,
rejoiced when John Scott became a millionaire, Lord Chancellor and first Earl of
Eldon. 9 CAMPBELL, LIVEs oF THE LoRD CHANcELLORS 109-137 (4th ed. 1857).
As Lord Chancellor from 1801 to 1827, Lord Eldon was noted for his inexcusable
delay in deciding cases. 10 Id. 225-235. The law might be clearer and better today
if he had delayed longer before deciding on the validity of Ann Cracherode's will.
3. Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. Jun. 521, 32 Eng. Rep. 947(1805), affirming the decree of Sir William Grant, Master of the Rolls, 9 Ves. Jun.
399, 32 Eng. Rep. 656 (1804).
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they often fail to grasp the full significance of the decision. It is surprising
that such able equity judges as Sir William Grant and Lord Eldon ap-
parently failed to realize that the real issue was the validity of a power
of appointment, not the enforceability of a trust. To be sure, no beneficiary
could sue to enforce Ann's trust until the bishop selected objects of benev-
olence and liberality, but that did not necessarily nullify the bishop's
power to select. If the Master of the Rolls and the Lord Chancellor had
considered the law of powers, instead of confining themselves to the law
of trusts, they might have reached a different result. Perhaps their failure
to do so was because the principal effort to sustain Ann's will was made
by the Attorney-General, who was interested in sustaining it only as a
charitable disposition.
Apart from the law of trusts, there is no rule that all of the possible ap-
pointees under a power of appointment must be definitely ascertainable from
the terms of the instrument creating the power.4 This is obvious in the
case of a general power of appointment, under which the donee may appoint
to any person or corporation in the world, including himself. It is also
true as to a special power of appointment, under which the donee may
not appoint to himself. 6 Even a power to appoint to anyone whatever
except the donee of the power is valid.7
The decision in Morice v. The Bishop of DurlamP has been defended
by an argument that, as a trust involves the splitting of the legal title
from the equitable, no trust can exist without a beneficiary capable of
4. RE STATEMENT, PROPERTY § 320, comment d, § 323, comment h (1940).
The latter comment states that a power is void if the possible appointees are so
indefinitely described that it is impossible to select anyone who could reasonably
be said to answer the description, but that a power may be valid although the
group of possible appointees is so large that its members could not be the bene-
ficiaries of a trust.
5. Gibbs v. Rumsey, 2 V. & B. 294, 35 Eng. Rep. 331 (1813) (bequest to
executors "to be disposed of unto such person and persons . . . as they in their
discretion shall think proper and expedient"; decision by Sir William Grant, Master
of the Rolls); Harvey v. Griggs, 12 Del. Ch. 232, 111 Atl. 437 (1920); In re
Dormer's Estate, 348 Pa. 356, 35 A.2d 299 (1944); Watts's Estate, 202 Pa. 85, 51
At. 588 (1902); In re Lidston's Estate, 32 Wash.2d 408, 202 P.2d 259 (1949).
6. In re Gestetner Settlement, [1953] Ch. 672; In re Coates, [1955] Ch. 495;
Re Gibbard, Public Trustee v. Davis, [1966] 1 All E. R. 273 (Ch.) (power to
appoint the residue amongst any of my old friends; gift over in default of appoint-
ment); In re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 P.2d 781 (1952); Cochran v.
McLaughlin, 128 Conn. 638, 24 A.2d 836 (1942) (power to appoint to such
benevolent institutions as the donee might select); Re Dowsley, 15 D.L.R.2d 560
(Ont. 1958); Goetz v. Bank of Martinsburg, 140 W. Va. 422, 84 S.E.2d 759 (1954).
7. Eyre v. Eyre, 49 L.T.R. (n.s.) 259 (Ch. 1883); In re Park, [1932] 1 Ch.
580; Re Ogilvy & Ogilvy, [1953] 1 D.L.R. 44 (Ont. 1952).
8. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, svpra note 3.
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suing to enforce it.° This is not so. A testamentary trust for "my grand-
children born more than ten years after my death" or for "such of my
giandchildren born more than ten years after my death as my trustee
may select" is valid and effective from the moment of the testator's death
although there is no beneficiary in being and none may come into being.10
So is a trust to support Old Dobbin" or to promote fox hunting.12 In
none of these cases is there any beneficiary capable of suing to enforce the
trust, yet the trusts are valid and their trustees may carry them out as
the Bishop of Durham sought to do. Even if the argument that a trust
cannot exist without a beneficiary capable of suing to enforce it were
sound, it would not explain the holding in the Morice case that the Bishop's
power of appointment was void. It is true, of course, that a trust for in-
definite objects or persons fails if there is no way to determine the intended
objects of the settlor's bounty,13 but it does not follow that the exercise
of a power of appointment is not a proper method of determining these
objects. If the persons who are to take legal title to legacies may be
determined by the exercise of a power of appointment created by the will
bequeathing the legacies, why should it not be possible to determine the
persons who are to take equitable title to property under a trust created
by the will in the same way?
One of Lord Eldon's claims to fame is that his decrees were never
-well, hardly ever-reversed or overruled.' 4 His decree in Morice v. The
9. In deciding the Morice case, Sir William Grant said, "There must be
somebody, in whose favour the Court can decree performance." 9 Ves. Jun. 399,
405, 32 Eng. Rep. 656, 658.
10. See Pibus v. Mitford, 1 Ventris 372, 86 Eng.Rep. 239 (1673); Hopkins
v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 581, 26 Eng.Rep. 365 (1738); Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves.
Jun. 227, 31 Eng.Rep. 117 (1799); Hayes v. Kershaw, 1 Sandf.Ch. 258 (N.Y.
Ch. 1844); Heyward-Williams Co. v. McCall, 140 Ga. 502, 79 S.E. 133 (1913);
Folk v. Hughes, 100 S.C. 220, 84 S.E. 713 (1915); Fratcher, Trmstor as Sole
Trustee and Only Ascertainable Beneficiary, 47 MicHr. L. REv. 907 (1949).
11. In re Dean; Cooper-Dean v. Stevens, 41 Ch.D. 552 (1889).
12. In re Thompson; Public Trustee v. Lloyd [1934J Ch. 342; RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TRUSTS § 124 (1959).
13. RESTATEMENT (SEcoN), TRuSTS §§ 112, 122, 123 (1959).
14. 10 CAMPBELL, LrvEs OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS 250-251 (4th ed. 1857).
The fact that for twenty-six years he was president of the House of Lords, then
the sole tribunal with power to reverse or overrule decrees of the High Court of
Chancery, may have had a bearing on this phenomenon. On one occasion Lord
Eldon was glad to be reversed. Having called to obtain the Sign Manual on a
state document at a time when King George III was convalescing from one of his
bouts with insanity, the Lord Chancellor was much embarrassed when the King
pressed him to accept his favorite watch as a gift. Lord Eldon flatly refused. After
the King had recovered fully the watch was sent to the Lord Chancellor with a
peremptory royal command to keep it, with which Lord Eldon complied. LoaD
ELDON'S ANECDOTE BOOK 8 (1960). In the King Edward VII Gallery of the
1967]
3
Fratcher: Fratcher: Powers of Appointment
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Bishop of Durhan.l5 was no exception. It has been followed by the House
of Lords and courts in the British Commonwealth.'6 The doctrine of Moride
v. The Bishop of Durham, as refined by subsequent decisions, would appear
to be that, although the possible appointees under a power of appoint-
ment unconnected with a trust need not be definite, a power to appoint
among a class of persons or purposes is void if: (1) because of the fidu-
ciary capacity in which he holds it or otherwise, the donee has an im-
perative duty to exercise the power; (2) the donee is not authorized to
appoint to himself; (3) all members of the class of possible appointees are
not definitely ascertainable from the terms of the instrument creating the
power; and (4) the class of possible appointees is not confined to char-
ities. The rule does not operate if any of these elements is absent. Thus,
even though the donee of the power is a trustee, the rule does not apply
if he is not under an imperative duty to exercise the power.' 7 Moreover,
the rule has an exception: a trustee's power to appoint among relatives
of the donor of the power is valid even though all of the relatives are not
ascertainable.' 8 Applying the developed rule and its exception we get the
following results:
1. A power to appoint to such objects of benevolence as the donee
of the power may select is valid if the donee has no duty to exercise the
power'0 but void if he has such a duty.2 °
British Museum there is displayed a watch with the letters "G. III R.", sur-
mounted by a crown, set in diamonds on the blue enamel of the case, deposited
by an anonymous benefactor. It might not be there if the Lord Chancellor had
never been reversed.
15. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, supra note 3.
16. E.g. James v. Allen, 3 Mer. 16, 36 Eng.Rep. 7 (1817) (trust for "benev-
olent purposes"; decision by Sir William Grant, M.R.); Vezey v. Jamson, 1 Sim.
& Stu. 69, 57 Eng.Rep. 27 (1822) (bequest to executors to apply to any Person
or Persons in such Shares and Proportions as the executors should in their discre-
tion think fit); In re Jarman's Estate, 8 Ch.D. 584 (1878) (trust for "any charita-
ble or benevolent purpose" selected by the executors); Chichester Diocesan Fund
v. Simpson, [1944] A.C. 341 (House of Lords). Other English cases are cited
and discussed in Scorr, TRusTs §§ 122-123, 398.1 (2d ed. 1956); Palmer, The
Effect of Indefiniteness on tke Validity of Trusts and Powers of Appointment, 10
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 241 (1963); Notes, 11 Mon. L. REv. 343 (1948), 104 L.J. 676(1954), 71 L.Q.R. 16 (1955), 17 L.Q.R. 465 (1955), 18 MoD. L. REv. 152 (1955).
For the situation in other Commonwealth countries, see Notes, 20 AusT. L.J. 216(1946), 24 AusT. L.J. 239 (1950), 33 CAN. B~AR REv. 334 (1955), In re Ashton,
Gordon v. Siddall, [1950] N.Z.L.R. 42.
17. In re Gestetner Settlement, [1953] Ch. 672.
18. Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469, 26 Eng.Rep. 299 (1739); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TRUSTS § 121 (1959); ScoTr, TRuSTS § 121 (2d ed. 1956).
19. Cochran v. McLaughlin, 128 Conn. 638, 24 A.2d 836 (1942); Goetz v.
Bank of Martinsburg, 140 W.Va. 422, 84 S.E.2d 759 (1954).
20. James v. Allen, 3 Mer. 16, 36 Eng.Rep. 7 (1817).
[Vol. 32
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- 2. A ^power to appoint to such 'friends of the testator as the donee
may select is valid if the donee has no duty to exercise the power 2 1 but
void if he has such a duty.
22
3. A power td appoint to such relatives of the testator as the donee may
select is valid whether the donee does or does not have a duty to exercise
the power.
23
The rule in Morice v. The Bishop of Durham24 has been followed by
most of the American courts that have considered the problem25 and was
accepted in the first edition of the Restatement of Trusts, which was pub-
lished in 1935.26 The American courts have, however, been more willing than
the English to find that a trust was exempt from the rule because confined
to charity2 7 The Morice rule has, moreover, been criticized by American
scholars,2s and at least two courts have flatly rejected it.29 The Restatement
(Second) Trusts, published in 1959, abandoned the rule in Morice v. The
Bishop of Durham. It provides that when a trust is created for such mem-
bers of an indefinite class of persons or for such indefinite purposes, not
limited to charity, as the trustee may select, the trustee's power to select
beneficiaries or purposes is valid.30
The arguments and opinions in Morice v. The Bishop of Durham3'
make it very clear that both counsel and judges thought that Ann Crach-
erode's trust and the bishop's power to select objects of benevolence and
liberality would be valid to the extent that the power was confined by its
21. Re Gibbard, Public Trustee v. Davis, [19661 1 All E.R. 273 (Ch. 1966);
In re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 P.2d 781 (1952); Re Dowsley, 15 D.L.R.2d
560 (Ont. 1958).
22. Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Mass. 472, 26 Am.Rep. 680 (1878); Clark v. Camp-
bell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 At. 166 (1926); Salveson's Trustees v. Wye, [19541 Sess.
Cas. 440 (Scotland). Cf. Adams v. Simpson, 358 Mo. 168, 213 S.W.2d 908 (1948)
(direction in will to distribute residue to friends and relations construed to limit
the class to friends who were also relations and, as so construed, valid).
23. Note 18 supra; Adams v. Simpson, supra note 22. Cf. Minot v. Attorney
General, 189 Mass. 176, 75 N.E. 149 (1905).
24. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, supra note 3.
25. The cases are collected in ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 122, 123, 398.1 (2d ed. 1956);
SiMES AND SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 894 (2d ed. 1956) and
Palmer, supra note 16. See also Adams v. Simpson, supra note 22.
26. § 122, comment d, § 123, comment c.
27. The cases are collected in Scorr, TRUSTS § 398.1 (2d ed. 1956).
28. Ames, The Failure of the "Tilden Trust," 5 HAuv. L. REV. 389 (1892);
Scott, Control of Property by the Dead, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 537 (1917); Scott,
Trusts for Charitable and Benevolent Purposes, 58 HAuv. L. REV. 548 (1945);
Sco-r, TRUSTS § 123 (1956); Palmer, supra note 16.
29. Dulles's Estate, 218 Pa. 162, 67 At. 49 (1907); Allred, Attorney General
v. Beggs, 84 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1935), 34 MIcH. L. REv. 582 (1936).
30. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 122, § 123 (1959).
31. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, spra note 3.
19,671
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terms to the selection of charitable objects. Both Attorney General Perceval
and Sir. Samuel Romilly had participated as counsel in the case of Mog-
gridge v. Tlackwel,32 which had been decided by Lord Eldon less than
two years before. In that case Ann Cam bequeathed the residue of her
personal estate to James Vaston, "desiring him to dispose of the same in
such charities as he shall think fit, recommending poor clergymen who have
large families and good characters." Mr. Vaston predeceased the testatrix.
The Lord Chancellor affirmed a decree directing the executor to dispose of
the residue according to a charitable scheme framed by the court, intimating
that Mr. Vaston's power of appointment to unspecified and indefinite
charities would have been valid if he had survived the testatrix. The scheme
framed by the court was not restricted to poor clergymen with large families
and good characters. The opinion makes it clear that, if he had lived to
exercise the power, Mr. Vaston would not have been restricted to such
clergymen in selecting charitable objects. In his opinion in Morice v. The
Bishop of Durham Lord Eldon stated clearly that if Ann Cracherode's will
had required the bishop to devote any part of the trust property to charity,
the trust would be valid to that extent;33 this view has been accepted in later
cases.8 4 No one who actually read the report of the Morice case could hon-
estly conclude that the decision invalidated a power of appointment to un-
specified charities. The overwhelming majority of American courts have
32. 7 Ves. Jun. 36, 32 Eng.Rep. 15 (1803). As in the Morice case, Sir Samuel
represented the next of kin and sought to have the trust declared invalid. Perceval,
then Solicitor-General, represented the executor who wanted the decree to be
affirmed. The Attorney-General argued that the bequest to charity should stand
but that the King rather than the court should frame the charitable scheme. Lord
Eldon thought that the King should frame the scheme only when no trustee is
named, as in the case of a bequest to "charity," and when a designated charity is
illegal. Perceval and Romilly had also appeared as opposing counsel in Attorney
General v. Stepney, 10 Ves.Jun. 22, 32 Eng.Rep. 751 (1804), in which Lord Eldon
held that a bequest to trustees "to purchase bibles and other religious books,
pamphlets, and tracts, as they should think fit" for a circulating library created a
valid charitable trust.
33. 10 Ves.Jun. at 537-538, 32 Eng.Rep. at 953 (1805).
34. E.g. In re Clarke, [19232 2 Ch. 407. In this case the residue was bequeathed
to (1) nursing homes for persons of limited means, (2) the Royal National Life-
boat Institution, (3) the Lister Institute of Preventive Medicine, and (4) "such
other funds, charities and institutions as my executors in their absolute discretion
shall think fit." The will directed division among these four objects "in such shares
and proportions as my trustees shall determine." It was held that the first three
purposes were confined to charity but the last was not; that the executors' powers
to divide among the four purposes and to allot funds to the fourth purpose were
void under the rule in Morice v. The Bishop of Durham; but that three quarters of
the residue were held on valid charitable trust for the first three purposes. The re-
maining quarter was held on resulting trust for the next of kin under the Morice
rule. Other cases are collected in Scorr, TRUSTS §§ 395-397 (2d ed. 1956).
[Vol. 32
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followed the view of the English courts that a power to appoint to unspeci-
fied charities is valid, whether or not it is conferred on a trustee or executor
and whether or not the donee of the power is under a duty to exercise it.35
During the years 1825 through 1828 a commission whose members
were hostile to the trust device revised the statutes of New York. This re-
vision, which was enacted in 1829, abolished all trusts except for enumerated
purposes, none of which was charitable, and restricted the duration of trusts
to two lives in being.3 6 At first the New York Court of Appeals held that
the Revised Statutes had not abolished the English law of charitable trusts,"7
but it soon manfested a tendency to apply the rule in Morice v. The Bishop
of Durham3 s with great rigor.39 In 1866 it overruled its earlier decisions by
holding that charitable trusts were governed by the Revised Statutes and
so were void unless they conformed to the same rules as to duration and
definiteness of beneficiaries as private trusts.40 It followed, of course, that
the rule in Morice v. The Bishop of Durham applied to all trusts, even
though confined exclusively to charity. This was assumed by the Court of
Appeals in 1891 when it held, in the much-publicized case of Tilden v.
Grenr,4 ' that a power to apply the residue of Governor Tilden's great
estate "to such charitable, educational, and scientific purposes as in the
judgment of my said executors and trustees will render the said rest, residue,
and remainder of my property most widely and substantially beneficial to
the interests of mankind" was wholly void, and that the residue passed to
the governor's next of kin. Probably because of this and similar cases, courts
in several states without statutes of the New York type, not fully aware
35. The cases are collected in ScoTr, TRUSTS §§ 395-397 (2d ed. 1956); Note,
16 U. DEr. L.J. 199 (1953). Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 395-397
(1959). When a charitable trust is to last for an extended period there is a substan-
tial advantage in the trustee having wide discretion in the selection of objects so
that he can adjust to changing conditions without applying to the court under the
cy pres doctrine. Trusts restricted to retired fire-engine horses or indigent Civil War
veterans serve no purpose presently. See Bogert, The Community Trust: Service
Opportunity for Lawyers, 41 A.B.A.J. 587 (1955).
36. The New York revisers sought to abolish all trusts except those for the
benefit of creditors or the support of a particular minor, married woman or lunatic.
See FRATcHER, PERPETUrTIES AND OTHER REsTRAIiNTs 210-213, 550-551 (1955).
37. Williams v. Williams, 8 N.Y. 525 (1853).
38. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, supra note 3.
39. Owens v. Missionary Society, 14 N.Y. 380, 67 Am. Dec. 160 (1856).
40. Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N.Y. 584 (1866); Scott, Charitable Trusts in
New York, 26 N.Y.U.L. REV. 251 (1951). Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin,
which had trust legislation copied from that of New York, soon reached the same
result. Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 3 N.W.
207 (1879); Little v. Willford, 31 Minn. 173, 17 N.W. 282 (1883); Ruth v. Ober-
brunner, 40 Wis. 238 (1876). See FRATCHER, op. cit. supra note 36, at 414-418.
41. 130 N.Y. 29, 28 N.E. 880, 14 L.R.A. 33, 27 Am.St.Rep. 487 (1891).
19671
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of the reason why the rule was so applied in New York, applied the rule in
Morice v. The Bishop of DUrham42 to strike down charitable trusts which
would have been valid in England and most of the states.43 Missouri, un-
fortunately, is one of the states in which this mistake was made, and its
law on this point has been doubtful for the last fifty years.44
Before examining the cases in which the applicability of the Morice
rule to charities was really involved, it is necessary to consider some in
which charitable dispositions failed because of another rule which is some-
times confused with it. Under both English law and that of most American
states if no intention to impose a trust is manifested on the face of a will,
but a legatee or devisee promises the testator to hold his legacy or devise
upon trust for stipulated persons or purposes, the legatee or devisee will be
allowed and compelled to hold the property so received upon constructive
trust for the beneficiaries of the promise.45 In England, if the intention is
manifested on the face of the will to create a private trust for beneficiaries
named outside the will, the legatee holds on trust for the intended benefici-
aries if they are named to him during the testator's lifetime.46 Under
English law, moreover, if an intention is manifested on the face of the will
to create a charitable trust for purposes to be named outside the will, the
trust does not fail. If the charitable purposes are named to the trustee, he
holds upon trust for them; 47 if they are not, the court will frame a charitable
scheme.48 In this country, if the will manifests an intention to create a
private trust for persons named outside the will, some states allow and
compel the trustee to hold for the intended beneficiaries if they are named
42. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, supra note 3.
43. These decisions are collected in Scorr, TRusTs § 396, note 4 (2d ed. 1956).
44. Tremayne, Definiteness of Charitable Purpose in Missouri, 23 WASH. U.L.Q.
556 (1938).
45. Oldham v. Litchfield, 2 Vern. 506, 23 Eng.Rep. 923 (1705); Drakeford v.
Wilks, 3 Atk. 539, 26 Eng.Rep. 1111 (1747); Strype v. Lewis, 352 Mo. 1004, 180
S.W.2d 688, 155 A.L.R. 99 (1944); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS § 55 (1959).
Other English and American cases are collected in ScOTT, TRUSTS § 55.1 (2d ed.
1956).
46. Blackwell v. Blackwell, [1929) A.C. 318, 67 A.L.R. 336. If the beneficiaries
are not named to the trustee during the testator's lifetime he holds on resulting trust
for the residuary devisees or legatees or for the heirs or next of kin of the testator.
In re Hawksley's Settlement, [1934) Ch. 384. See In re Boyes, 26 Ch.D. 531 (1884).
47. In re Williams, [1933) Ch. 244.
48. Attorney General v. Syderfin, 7 Ves.Jun. 43 n., 32 Eng.Rep. 33 n. (1683).
This case was followed in Anon., 2 Freem.Ch. 261, 22 Eng.Rep. 1197 (1702), and
Mills v. Farmer, 1 Mer. 55, 35 Eng.Rep. 597 (1815) (Eldon, L.C.), and cited with
approval in In re Gott, Glazebrook v. University of Leeds, [1944) 1 Ch. 193. The
opinion in the last case observes, correctly, that the rule in Attorney General v.
Syderfin is not accepted by RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 395 (1935), and the same ob-
servation is true of RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 395 (1959).
[Vol. 32
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to him during the testator's lifetime; others require him to hold on resulting
trust for the next of kin.49 By the majority rule in this country, if the
will manifests an intention to create a trust for purposes, as distinguished
from persons, named outside the will, the trust fails and the trustee holds
on resulting trust for the residuary legatees or next of kin whether or not the
purposes are disclosed to him by the testator and whether or not they are
confined to charity.50 This last rule is the one which tends to be confused
with the rule in Morice v. The Bishop of Durham. It has nothing to do with
powers of appointment conferred on trustees.
The Supreme Court of Missouri decided in 1860 that the general prin-
ciples of the English Law of charitable trusts are in force in Missouri, and
that, in consequence, a trust for a charitable purpose is valid here although
it may last forever, the interests of persons who benefit from the charity
may vest beyond the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, and the se-
lection of these persons is left to the trustee.5 1 The decision involved a
bequest upon trust "to furnish relief to all poor emigrants and travelers
coming to St. Louis on their way, bona fide, to settle in the west." As the
will itself specified a particular charitable purpose, the question of whether
power to select charitable objects or purposes may be conferred upon a
trustee was not really in issue, but counsel for the heirs of the testator urged
the precise argument which has been used to support the rule in Morice v.
The Bishop of Durham,52 that a trust cannot exist without a beneficiary
capable of suing to enforce it 5 3 and contended that, even if that were not the
case, the purpose of the trust in question was too vague and uncertain for
enforcement.54 In rejecting these arguments, the court suggested that a
49. The cases are collected in SCOTT, TRUSTS § 55.8 (2d ed. 1956).' The
RESTATEMENT favors a trust for the intended beneficiaries in this situation if the
legatee promised the testator to hold on trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §
66, comment h (1959). Missouri appears to hold that the property passes to the
residuary legatees or next of kin by way of resulting trust. Plummer v. Roberts, 315
Mo. 627, 287 S.W. 316 (1926).
50. The cases are collected in SCOTT, TRUSTS § 359 (2d ed. 1956). The
RESTATEMENT favors the English and minority American view, under which the
trustee holds on trust for charitable purposes named outside the will if he promised
the testator to do so. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS § 359, comment e (1959).
The RESTATEMENT takes the position that if the intention to create a trust is man-
ifested on the face of the will and the beneficiaries or purposes are disclosed to the
trustee by the testator, the trustee will not be allowed to perform the intended
trust unless he promised the testator to do so. § 54, comment a, § 55, comment h,
§ 358, comment d, § 359, comment e, § 411, comment q. The reasons given for
this position in the last comment cited are not convincing.
51. Chambers v. City of St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543 (1860).
52. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. Jun. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805).
53. 29 Mo. at 546. See notes 8-13 supra.
54. 29 Mo. at 549-551.
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bequest merely for pious causes would be valid,55 cited Moggridge v. Tlrack-
well"0 with approval, and intimated that if Mr. Vaston, the trustee named
in Ann Cam's will, had survived the testatrix, his power to dispose of the
residue to "such charities as he shall think fit" would have been valid.'1
The first Missouri case which has caused confusion on the question
under discussion is Sclmucker's Estate v. Reel,5 s decided in 1876. The will
there involved bequeathed to the executor, "two hundred dollars, to be ap-
plied to a specific purpose which I have explained to him. . . . [f]ive
hundred dollars for another and specific charitable purpose which he well
understands," and the residue, "to apply in charity, according to his best
discretion." The will provided that the receipt of the Roman Catholic Arch-
bishop should be a full discharge to the executor "for any monies applied by
him to charities according to my request," and the testator gave the executor
a memorandum requesting that all three legacies be used for masses. The
court cited Morice v. The Bislop of Durham59 for the proper purpose of
showing that the legacies were not for the executor's personal use, dis-
cussed inconclusively the problem of bequests for purposes named outside
the will, and held the three legacies void as a fraudulent attempt to evade
a provision of the Constitution of Missouri which, as interpreted by the
court, made bequests for masses illegal. 60
The next troublesome case is Corby v. Corby,61 decided in 1884. The
testator's homemade will first devised all his property to his wife. It then
bequeathed some personal property to her for life subject to the conditions,
first, that she pay his debts,
Secondly, that after providing for her own wants and comforts,
I leave to the discretion of my dear wife to give to such of my
relations such aid or assistance as my dear wife may, of her own
will, think proper and just, hereby declaring that my relatives have
no claim of any kind upon me, or upon any of my property; and
anything that they may receive from my said wife, out of my
worldly effects, shall be in accordance with her sense of justice,
and in accordance with my wishes, the nature of which she has
been advised of by me during my life. Secondly [sic], that the
balance of my said property will be given to advance the cause of
55. Id. at 584.
56. Moggridge v. Thackwell, supra note 32, cited 29 Mo. at 590.
57. 29 Mo. at 591.
58. 61 Mo. 592 (1876).
59. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, supra note 52.
60. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 13 (1865), RSMo 1867, at 22.
61. 85 Mo. 371 (1884).
[Vol. 32
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [1967], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss4/2
POWERS TO SELECT CHARITIES
religion and promote the cause of charity, in such manner as my
dearly beloved wife may think will be most conducive to the
carrying out of my wishes.
The heirs of the testator sued the widow to compel her to account as
trustee for them. A decree sustaining a demurrer to the petition was affirmed
by a unanimous court. The opinion, written by a special judge, indicates that
the widow took at least a beneficial life estate free of trust and that there
was no intent to create a trust for the testator's relatives, but it does not
make clear whether the widow took an absolute fee free of trust or held
the remainder subject to an attempted charitable trust. Judges Norton and
Ray concurred specially on the understanding that widow took only a
life estate with the remainder passing intestate. Chief Justice Henry con-
curred in the result but thought that the widow took a life estate "with a
power of disposition limited only by her discretion and the purposes for
which such disposition may be made." After this decision the testator's
heirs conveyed their interest in the estate, if any, to the widow. When she
died, the Attorney-General sued to establish a charitable trust of the re-
mainder.62 The court interpreted the first decision as being what Judges
Norton and Ray understood it to be, a holding that the widow took a life
estate with the remainder passing as intestate property, and indicated great
reluctance to disturb this holding because of numerous transfers of property
made in reliance on it. It dismissed the suit on the ground that the testator
intended particular charities named to his wife outside the will which, in
view of her death, could no longer be ascertained and expressly declined to
pass on the question of whether the widow had had a valid power to select
charities.63 The same result could have been reached on at least three other
theories: 1. It could have been held that Mrs. Corby took a fee simple
absolute, free of trust. 2. It could have been held that Mrs. Corby took a
beneficial life estate and a power of appointment of the remainder which
she had no duty to exercise. 3. It could have been held that Mrs. Corby took
a life estate and a power of appointment of the remainder on trust which she
had a duty to exercise, but that, as she could have appointed the whole to
relatives of the testator, her purchase of their interest entitled her to ap-
point to herself. The theory upon which the case was decided would seem
to be inconsistent with Attorney-General v. Syderfin,6 4 but that case was
decided by Lord Keeper Guilford, whose reputation as an equity judge was
62. Hadley v. Forsee, 203 Mo. 418, 101 S.W. 59, 14 L.R.A.(n.s.) 49 (1907).
63. Id. at 429, 101 S.W. at 61.
64. Attorney-General v. Syderfin, supra note 48.
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not of the highest.05 The theory was not inconsistent with Moggrlidge v.
Thackwell,a6 and it did not extend the rule in Morice v. The Bishop of
Ditrham0 7 to charitable trusts.
In Howe v. Wilsonl, 68 decided in 1886, it was held that a testamentary
direction to a trustee to divide trust funds "among such charitable institu-
tions of the city of St. Louis, Missouri, as he shall deem worthy" was valid.
This case was followed in Powell v. Hatch,69 decided in 1890, holding that
a devise of the residue to a trustee for "such charitable purposes as my said
trustee may deem best" was valid. The opinion clearly recognized that the
true issue was the validity of a power of appointment to unspecified char-
ities. Sappington v. The Sappington School Fund Trustees,7" decided in 1894,
held valid a trust to educate poor children in Saline County; any surplus
income to be applied by the trustees "to such other objects of charity in
said county as in their judgment may be most needy." In Sandusky v.
Sandusky,71 decided in 1914, a residuary devise to a trustee for the benefit
of four named churches "and, secondarily, for the general advancement of
Christianity," was held valid.
It thus appears that, until 1917, the Missouri decisions were all con-
sistent with the English and majority American view that a power of appoint-
ment "to unspecified charities is valid.72 Then came Jones v. Patterson,73
which involved a devise to an executor "to be used for missionary purposes
in whatever field he thinks best to use it, so it is done in the name of my
65. 4 CAMPBELL, LIvEs OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS 280, 315, 333 (4th ed. 1857);
KEETON, LORD CHANCELLOR JEFFREYS AND THE STUART CAUSE 102, 375-380 (1965).Attorney-General v. Syderfin was, however, followed by Lord Eldon, after extended
argument, in Mills v. Farmer, 1 Mer. 55, 35 Eng.Rep. 597 (1815). It is rejected by
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 395, comment a (1959).
66. Moggridge v. Thackwell, supra note 32.
67. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, supra note 52.
68. 91 Mo. 45 (1886).
69. 100 Mo. 592, 14 S.W. 49 (1890).
70. 123 Mo. 32, 27 S.W. 356 (1894).
71. 261 Mo. 351, 168 S.W. 1150 (1914).
72. The coming change was presaged, however, by Board of Trustees v. May,
201 Mo. 361, 99 S.W. 1093 (1906), in which a devise to "the Methodist E. Church,
South, and Missionary cause" was held void because of the failure to specify which
church organization and what missionary cause. The opinion did suggest that the
devise might have been valid if a trustee had been empowered to select the church
and missionary cause. 201 Mo. 361, 369, 99 S.W. 1093, 1094 (1906).
73. 271 Mo. 1, 195 S.W. 1004; see Annot., 1917F L.R.A. 660 (1917), noted, 20
U. Mo. BULL. L. SER. 53 (1920). It is noteworthy that the Attorney-General was not
made a party to this case, as he should have been, in order to defend the charitable
devise. See Thatcher v. City of St. Louis, 343 Mo. 597, 122 S.W.2d 915 (1938).
A devise to "charity connected with the Methodist Episcopal Church of the
U.S." was held void on the authority of Jones v. Patterson in Methodist Episcopal
Church of United States of America v. Walters, 50 F.2d 416 (W.D. Mo. 1928).
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dear Savior and for the salvation of souls." The court recognized that the
problem involved was the validity of a power of selection conferred on a
trustee and held it void because the will failed to specify the particular
denomination whose doctrines were to be propagated, the class of persons
who were to benefit, or what benefit they were to receive, saying, "Strong
and far-reaching as is the arm of equity in upholding a charity, the one here
sought to be created is beyond its grasp." This astounding decision, which
had the unadmitted effect of overruling all the previous Missouri decisions
on the validity of powers of appointment to charity, was buttressed by the
citation of a Missouri case holding that the purposes of a private trust must
be definite74 and of Morice v. The Bishop of Durh-am, 75 Owens v. Missionary
Society76 and Tilden v. Green,7 none of which has any proper application
to charitable trusts in Missouri. Wentura v. Kinnerk,78 decided in 1928, was
a will contest grounded on undue influence. In order to raise a presumption
of undue influence the contestant contended that a residuary devise "to
such charitable uses and purposes as [the executor] may determine" was
designed to give the executor the residue beneficially. The court properly
rejected this contention but added, "There can be no doubt but that the
bequest to charity is void," citing Schn-ucker's Estate v. Reel,79 Morice v.
The Bishop of Durham"° and Jones v. Patterson.8
Three months after the decision in Wentura v. Kinnerk82 the Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed the validity of a bequest to an individual "to be
spent on the welfare of poor, homeless children" in an opinion which relied
on Howe v. Wilson's Executor83 and Powell v. Hatch,84 both of which were
inconsistent with the rationale of Jones v. Patterson5 and Went nra v.
Kinnerk.s 6 In 1931 the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit passed on the validity of a devise of the residue of a Mis-
74. Jones v. Jones, 223 Mo. 424, 123 S.W. 29 (1909).
75. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, supra note 52.
76. Owens v. Missionary Society, supra note 39.
77. Tilden v. Green, supra note 41.
78. 319 Mo. 1068, 5 S.W.2d 66 (1928). As in Jones v. Patterson, supra note
73, the Attorney-General was not made a party. In Kinnerk v. Smith, 328 Mo. 513,
524, 41 S.W.2d 381, 386 (1931), the Supreme Court conceded that the validity of
the residuary devise to charity was not in issue in Wentura v. Kinnerk and that,
therefore, the language indicating its invalidity was obiter dictum.
79. Schmucker's Estate v. Reel, supra note 58.
80. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, supra note 52.
81. Jones v. Patterson, supra note 73.
82. Wentura v. Kinnerk, supra note 78.
83. Howe v. Wilson's Executor, supra note 68.
84. Powell v. Hatch, supra note 69.
85. Jones v. Patterson, supra note 73.
86. Wentura v. Kinnerk, supra note 78; St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Little,
320 Mo. 1058, 10 S.W.2d 47 (1928).
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souri estate to trustees for "such charitable, benevolent, hospital, infirmary,
public, educational, scientific, literary, library or research purpose in Kansas
City, Missouri, as said Trustees shall in their absolute discretion determine
to be in the public interest." After an exhaustive review of the Missouri
cases, the court concluded that the discretion of the trustees was confined
to charity and that their power to select charities was valid.87 The court
refused to follow Jones v. Patterson8 8 and Wentura v. Kinnerks9 because
they were "expressly bottomed upon a misapprehension of the holding in
Morice v. Bishop of Durhaom."
Standley v. Allen,90 decided in 1942, involved the validity of provisions
in two wills. One of these devised a remainder to a trustee "for the pur-
pose of having him dispose of the same to some worthy charitable organi-
zation, in Missouri, to be selected by him; Provided, if at said time there
shall be in Southwest Missouri, a home for aged people, I charge my
trustee with the duty of transferring the said trust estate to said Institution."
The other will bequeathed the residue of an estate to a trustee "with the
duty of disposing of said balance of my estate to some worthy charitable
organization, in Missouri, and the preference to be given to aged people."
Both charitable dispositions were held valid on the authority of Section 396
of the Restatement of Trusts,91 Howe v. Wilson92 and Powell v. Hatch.9 3
Gossett v. Swinney9" was cited with approval but the opinion did not
mention Jones v. Patterson9 5 or Went ura v. Kinnerk.° " Altman v.
McCutchlen,7 decided in 1948, involved a will which directed the executor
to sell the entire estate and provided:
87. Gossett v. Swinney, 53 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 286 U.S.
545 (1932). It should be borne in mind that this case was decided before the
decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), that federal courts
are bound to follow state decisions on matters governed by the common law of the
state.
88. Jones v. Patterson, supra note 73.
89. Wentura v. Kinnerk, supra note 78.
90. 349 Mo. 1115, 163 S.W.2d 1012 (1942).
91. See note 35 supra.
92. Howe v. Wilson, supra note 68. The opinion cites other appropriate Mis-
souri cases, most of which have been discussed. Apparently the next of kin relied
heavily on Robinson v. Crutcher, 277 Mo. 1, 187 S.W. 31 (1918), noted 21 U. Mo.
BULL. L. SER. 31 (1921), in which a devise to the capital of township school funds
was held void for want of a trustee, and Mort v. Baker University, 229 Mo. App.
632, 28 S.W.2d 498 (1935), in which a devise to the Rural Schools of Caldwell
County was held void on a like theory. As the court observed, the Robinson case
was overruled by Burrier v. Jones, 338 Mo. 679, 92 S.W.2d 885 (1936).
93. Powell v. Hatch, supra note 69.
94. Gossett v. Swinney, supra note 87.
95. Jones v. Patterson, supra note 73.
96. Wentura v. Kinnerk, supra note 78.
97. 210 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 1948).
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Because my said executor is quite familiar with my wishes as
to ultimate disposition of the proceeds of my property, that is that
I wish it devoted to the charitable and other institutions devoted
to alleviation of human suffering and want, which I have been de-
voted, and in which I am interested. I give him unlimited dis-
cretion to dispose of such proceeds after paying obligations of my
estate and costs of administration, among those charitable institu-
tions in such amount and proportions as he sees fit I do this in
the confidence that he will in good faith endeavor to do with same
after my death as I would do if there in the flesh.
The executor's power to appoint to unspecified charities was held valid with-
out discussion of the question whether the testator meant to confine the
power to particular charities named to him outside the will. The opinion
relied on Standley v. Allen9 s and the authorities cited in it and expressly
approved the reasons advanced by the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for refusing to follow Jones v. Patterson99 and Wentura v. Kinnerk'00
in Gossett v. Swinney. 0 ' Unfortunately, the court did not expressly over-
rule Jones v. Patterson and Wentura v. Kinvmerk so these unsound decisions
could still be cited by next of kin eager to destroy a charitable trust.
0 2
In Epperly v. Mercantile Trust and Savings Bank of Quincy, Illinois1'8
the residue of an estate was devised to an Illinois bank as trustee:
to hold and manage and pay over the net income thereof as
follows:
I leave to the discretion of my Trustees the distribution of
the income to Protestant churches and religious organizations but
direct that the gifts be used to save souls and not to build buildings
or to improve existing buildings.
98. Standley v. Allen, supra note 90.
99. Jones v. Patterson, supra note 73.
100. Wentura v. Kinnerk, supra note 78.
101. Gossett v. Swinney, supra note 87.
102. SHEPARD'S MISSOURI CITATIONS 1401, 1652 (Case Edition 1963) lists
Jones v. Patterson and Wentura v. Kinnerk as "distinguished" in Altman v.
McCutchen. Gossett v. Swinney, supra note 87, was cited with approval in Taylor
v. Baldwin, 247 S.W.2d 741, 749 (Mo. 1952) and Carlock v. Ladies Cemetery
Ass'n., 317 S.W.2d 432, 437 (Mo. 1958). The opinion in the latter case remarked,
"It has been considered Jones v. Patterson may have misapplied the law."
103. 415 S.W.2d 819 (Mo. 1967). The opinion states that the Illinois bank
was incapable of receiving the trust property under § 456.120, RSMo 1959, but
that a successor trustee could exercise the power to select charities. It was held in
Moggridge v. Thackwell, supra note 32, that a power of appointment to unspeci-
fied charities did not fail because the trustee could not act and the weight of
authority favors this view. Sco-rr, TRUSTS § 397 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TRUSTS § 397, comment b (1959).
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The administratrix cwmn testamento annexo sued the heirs and the Attorney
General for a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the residuary dis-
position. It was held void by the circuit court, and the heirs defended this
determination on appeal by citing Board of Trustees of Methodist Episcopal
Church, South v. May,'0 4 Hadley v. Forsee'0 5 and Jones v. Patterson.10 6 The
decree was reversed and the residuary disposition held to create a valid
charitable trust for such Protestant churches and religious organizations as
the trustee may select. In the course of its opinion the Supreme Court said:
Where, as here, a trust provision gives to the trustee discretion
in applying the trust property to the specified charitable purpose,
the rules in Jones v. Patterson, supra, and other cases cited by re-
spondents, should not be followed. Although there is conflict in the
decisions, the weight of authority is that a charitable trust such
as this trust is valid. * * * The class of religious organizations is
here sufficiently certain: Protestant churches and religious organi-
zations to be selected in the discretion of trustees.
The result reached in the Epperly case is sound but the opinion is
disappointing. Jones v. PattersonAor and Wentura v. Kinnerk0 s were not
categorically overruled as they should have been. The quoted language
suggests that a will conferring power on a trustee to select charities must
specify the general types of charities to be selected. Such language invites
more attacks on powers to appoint to charity on the ground that the class
of possible appointees is not sufficiently definite. It seems unfortunate that
the Supreme Court did not use this opportunity to make it crystal clear
that the rule in Morice v. The Bishop of Durham' 9 has no application what-
ever to a power of appointment that is confined to charity and that, under
the rule in Moggridge v. Thackwell, i"0 which it accepted in 1860111 and
applied correctly in 1890,112 a power of appointment to unspecified charities
is valid although the instrument creating the power does not limit in any
way the possible charitable appointees.
104. Board of Trustees v. May, supra note 72.
105. Hadley v. Forsee, supra note 62.
106. Jones v. Patterson, supra note 73.
107. Ibid.
108. Wentura v. Kinnerk, supra note 78.
109. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, supra note 52.
110. Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. Jun. 36, 32 Eng. Rep. 15 (1803).
111. See notes 51, 56 supra.
112. Powell v. Hatch, supra note 69, holding that a devise of the residue to a
trustee for "such charitable purposes as my said trustee may deem best" was valid.
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